We propose behavioral learning equilibria as a plausible explanation of coordination of individual expectations and aggregate phenomena such as excess volatility in stock prices and high persistence in inflation. Boundedly rational agents use a simple univariate linear forecasting rule and in equilibrium correctly forecast the unconditional sample mean and first-order sample autocorrelation. In the long run, agents thus learn the best univariate linear forecasting rule, without fully recognizing the structure of the economy. The simplicity of our behavioral learning equilibria makes coordination of individual expectations on such an aggregate outcome more likely. In a first application, an asset pricing model with AR(1) dividends, a unique stochastic consistent expectations equilibrium (SCEE) exists characterized by high persistence and excess volatility, and it is globally stable under learning. In a second application, the New Keynesian Phillips curve, multiple equilibria co-exist and learning exhibits path dependence and inflation may switch between low and high persistence regimes.
Introduction
Expectation feedback plays a crucial role in economics and finance. Since the introduction by Muth (1961) , and its application in macroeconomics by Lucas (1972) , the Rational Expectation Hypothesis (REH) has become the predominant paradigm. A Rational Expectation Equilibrium (REE) is in fact a fixed point of an expectation feedback system. Typically it is assumed that rational agents perfectly know the correctly specified market equilibrium equations as well as their parameter values.
Despite its popularity, the REH has been criticized for its highly demanding and unrealistic information requirements. Adaptive learning models have been proposed as an alternative to rational expectations (Marcet and Sargent, 1989; Bullard, 1994 ; see Sargent (1993, 1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for extensive surveys). In contrast to rational expectations, adaptive learning models assume that agents do not have perfect knowledge about market equilibrium equations, but agents are assumed to have some belief, the perceived law of motion, about the actual law of motion; the corresponding parameters are not known, but are estimated by adaptive learning based on available observations. The implied actual law of motion under adaptive learning is thus a timevarying self referential system, depending on the perceived law of motion. Under this framework, a rational expectations equilibrium is simply a situation in which the implied law of motion exactly coincides with the perceived law of motion, and adaptive learning may converge to such a rational expectations equilibrium. In other words, convergence of adaptive learning to a rational expectations equilibrium can occur when the perceived law of motion is correctly specified.
In general a perceived law of motion will be misspecified. White (1994) argues that an economic model or a probability model is only a more or less crude approximation to whatever might be the "true" relationships among the observed data and consequently it is necessary to view economic and/or probability models as misspecified to some greater or lesser degree. Sargent (1991) first develops a notion of equilibrium as a fixed point of an operator that maps the perceived law of motion (a vector ARMA process) into a statistically optimal estimator of the actual law of motion. This may be viewed as an early example of a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE), as defined by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) , formalizing the idea that agents have misspecified beliefs, but within the context of their forecasting model they are unable to detect their misspecification. Branch (2006) gives an excellent survey and argues that the RPE is a natural alternative to rational expectation equilibrium because it is to some extent consistent with Muth's original hypothesis of REE while allowing for bounded rationality by restricting the class of the perceived law of motion.
The main contribution of our paper is to develop a behavioral learning equilibrium concept, where agents try to learn a simple but misspecified forecasting rule. Our equilibrium concept -Stochastic Consistent Expectations Equilibrium (SCEE) -may be viewed as the simplest RPE and therefore it seems more likely as a description of aggregate behavior, because a large population of indiviudal agents may coordinate their expectations more easily and learn such a simple behavioral equilibrium. The actual law of motion (ALM) of the economy is a two (or higher) dimensional linear stochastic system. Agents are forecasting one variable -say the price -of the economy using a simple univariate AR (1) forecasting rule. In a SCEE the mean and the first-order autocorrelation of realized prices in the economy coincide with the corresponding mean and first-order autocorrelation of agents' AR(1) perceived law of motion (PLM). In addition, a simple adaptive learning scheme -Sample Autocorrelation Leaning (SAC-learning) -with an intuitive behavioral interpretation, enforces convergence to the (stable) SCEE.
We illustrate our behavioral learning equilibrium concept in two standard applications.
In the first -an asset pricing model with an exogenous stochastic dividend process -the SCEE is unique and the SAC-learning scheme always converges to the SCEE. The SCEE is characterized by highly persistent prices (close to unit root) and excess volatility with asset prices volatility more than doubled compared to REE. In the second application -a New Keynesian Philips curve (NKPC) -with an exogenous AR(1) process for the output gap and an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) stochastic shock to inflation -multiple stable SCEE may co-exist. In particular, for empirically plausible parameter values a SCEE with highly persistent inflation exists, matching the stylized facts of US-inflation data.
Related literature
Our behavioral equilibrium is closely related to the Consistent Expectations Equilibrium (CEE) introduced by Hommes and Sorger (1998) , where agents believe that prices follow a linear AR(1) stochastic process, whereas the implied actual law of motion is a deterministic chaotic nonlinear process. Along a CEE, price realizations have the same sample mean and sample autocorrelation coefficients as the AR(1) perceived law of mo-tion. A CEE is another early example of a RPE and may be seen as an "approximate rational expectations equilibrium", in which the misspecified perceived law of motion is the best linear approximation within the class of perceived laws of motion of the actual (unknown) nonlinear law of motion. Hommes and Rosser (2001) investigate CEE in an optimal fishery management model and used numerical simulations to study adaptive learning of CEE in the presence of dynamic noise. The adaptive learning scheme used here is SAC-learning, where the parameters of the AR(1) forecasting rule are updated based on the observed sample average and first-order sample autocorrelation. Sögner and Mitlöhner (2002) apply the CEE concept to a standard asset pricing model with independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) dividends and showed that the unique CEE coincides with the REE. As we will see in the current paper, introducing autocorrelations in the stochastic dividend process will lead to learning equilibrium different from REE. Tuinstra (2003) analyzes first-order consistent expectations equilibria numerically in a deterministic overlapping generations (OLG) model. Hommes et al (2004) generalize the notion of CEE to nonlinear stochastic dynamic economic models, introducing the concept of stochastic consistent expectations equilibrium (SCEE). In a SCEE, agents' perceptions about endogenous variables are consistent with the actual realizations of these variables in the sense that the unconditional mean and autocorrelations of the unknown nonlinear stochastic process, which describes the actual behavior of the economy, coincide with the unconditional mean and autocorrelations of the AR(1) process agents believe in. They applied this concept to an OLG model and studied the existence of SCEE and its relationship to sample autocorrelation learning (SAC-learning) based on numerical simulations.
Showing theoretically existence of SCEE and its relationship to adaptive learning has proven to be technically difficult, while convergence of SAC-learning has been studied only by numerical simulations. The principle technical difficulty here is to calculate autocor- The current paper studies the existence of SCEE and its stability under SAC-learning in two standard applications: an asset pricing model and the New Keynesian Philips curve. In both applications the driving variables (dividends or real marginal costs) are assumed to follow AR(1) processes. More specifically, while the perceived law of motion agents believe in is an AR(1) process with white noise, the true process of economy is not an AR(1) process but a linear stochastic process driven by an exogenous autocorrelated process. In addition to the conceptual contribution of introducing a behavioral learning equilibrium, our paper makes two methodological contributions. First, we prove existence of SCEE under general conditions in a misspecified framework, where prices (inflation) have the same mean as REE. Second, we present the first proof that the SAC-learning converges to stable SCEE and provide simple and intuitive stability conditions. SCEE thus represents a fixed point of learning dynamics under misspecification. Moreover, we provide interesting results in our two applications. In the asset pricing model, we show that the SCEE is unique and (globally) stable and characterized by market prices fluctuating around fundamental prices and exhibiting stronger serial autocorrelations and higher volatility than the REE for plausible parameters. In the New Keynesian Philips curve, we show that multiple SCEE may exist. In particular, for a large set of plausible parameters a SCEE exists with highly persistent inflation. Coordination on a behavioral learning equilibrium may thus explain high persistence in inflation (Milani, 2007) . Some other related literature, for example Timmermann (1993 Timmermann ( , 1996 , Bullard and Duffy (2001) , Guidolin and Timmermann (2007) and Bullard et al. (2010) , shows the effects of learning on asset returns from different perspectives. Timmermann (1993 Timmermann ( , 1996 shows that learning helps to explain excess volatility and predictability of stock returns in the similar present value asset pricing model. In Timmermann (1993 Timmermann ( , 1996 , the perceived law of motion is correctly specified but the related parameters are estimated by adaptive learning, and in the long run learning converges to REE. Bullard and Duffy The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main concepts, i.e. firstorder SCEE and sample autocorrelation learning in a general framework. Section 3 studies existence and stability under SAC-learning theoretically as well as numerically in a standard asset pricing model. Section 4 presents a second application, the New Keynesian Philips curve, and shows existence of multiple SCEE and the relationship to SAC-learning theoretically and numerically. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Preliminary concepts
This section briefly introduces the main concepts. Suppose that the law of motion of an economic system is given by the stochastic difference equation 
where α and β are real numbers with β ∈ (−1, 1) and {δ t } is a white noise process; α is the unconditional mean of x t while β is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. Given the perceived law of motion (2.3), the 2-period ahead forecasting rule for x t+1 that minimizes the mean-squared forecasting error is
Combining the expectations (2.4) and the law of motion of the economy (2.1), we obtain the implied actual law of motion (ALM)
with y t an AR(1) process as in (2.2).
Stochastic Consistent Expectations Equilibrium (SCEE)
We are now ready to recall the definition of stochastic consistent expectations equi- That is to say, a first-order SCEE is characterized by the fact that both the unconditional mean and the unconditional first-order autocorrelation coefficient generated by the actual (unknown) stochastic process (2.5) coincide with the corresponding statistics for the perceived linear AR (1) Finally, we note that in a first-order SCEE, the orthogonality condition imposed by Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE)
is satisfied. The orthogonality condition shows that agents can not detect the correlation between their forecasting errors and the agent's perceived model, see Branch (2006) . The first-order SCEE is a RPE where agents have their model incorrect; but within the context of their forecasting model agents are unable to detect their misspecification.
Sample autocorrelation learning
In the above definition of first-order SCEE, agents' beliefs are described by the linear forecasting rule (2.4) with fixed parameters α and β. However, the parameters α and β are usually unknown. In the adaptive learning literature, it is common to assume that agents behave like econometricians using time series observations to estimate the parameters as additional observations become available. Following Hommes and Sorger (1998), we assume that agents use sample autocorrelation learning (SAC-learning) to learn the parameters α and β. That is, for any finite set of observations {x 0 , x 1 , · · · , x t }, the sample average is given by 6) and the first-order sample autocorrelation coefficient is given by
Hence α t and β t are updated over time as new information arrives.
Adaptive learning is sometimes referred to as statistical learning, because agents act as statisticians or econometricians and use a statistical procedure such as OLS to estimate and update parameters over time. SAC-learning may be viewed as another statistical learning procedure. We would like to stress however that SAC-learning has a simple behavioral interpretation that agents simply infer the sample average and persistence (i.e.
first-order autocorrelation) from time series observations. We focus on the entire sample average for α t in (2.6) and sample first-order autocorrelation for β t in (2.7) over the entire time-horizon, but one could also restrict the learning to the last T observations with T relatively small (e.g., T = 100 or even smaller). It is an easy and natural way for agents, especially those without professional training, to estimate mean and first-order autocorrelation directly based on data instead of some complicated statistical techniques.
Define
then the SAC-learning is equivalent to the following recursive dynamical system (see
The actual law of motion under SAC-learning is therefore given by
with α t , β t as in (2.8) and y t as in (2.2).
In Hommes and Sorger (1998), the map f in (2.9) is a nonlinear deterministic function depending only on
, without the driving variable y t and the noise u t . Hommes et al. (2004) extend the CEE framework to SCEE, with f a nonlinear stochastic process (but without exogenous driving variable y t ). In this paper the map f is a linear function, depending on not only α t−1 + β 2 t−1 (x t−1 − α t−1 ) and u t but also on an exogenous AR(1) process y t . Hence, the true law of motion of the economy is a two dimensional linear stochastic process, while agents try to forecast using a univariate linear model. In the following we give two typical examples in economies and study existence of first-order SCEE and its relationship to SAC-learning in detail.
An asset pricing model with AR(1) dividends
A simple example of the general framework (2.1) is given by the standard present value asset pricing model with stochastic dividends; see for example Brock and Hommes (1998).
Here we consider AR(1) dividends instead of independent and identically distributed
Assume that agents can invest in a risk free asset or in a risky asset. The risk-free asset is perfectly elastically supplied at a gross return R > 1. p t denotes the price (ex dividend) of the risky asset and y t denotes the (random) dividend process. Let E t , V t denote the subjective beliefs of a representative agent about the conditional expectation and conditional variance of excess return p t+1 + y t+1 − Ry t . By the assumption that the agent is a myopic mean-variance maximizer of tomorrow's wealth, the demand z t for the risky asset by the representative agent is then given by
where a > 0 denotes the risk aversion coefficient and the belief about the conditional variance of the excess return is assumed to be constant over time
Equilibrium of demand and supply implies
where z s denotes the supply of outside shares in the market, assumed to be constant over time. Without loss of generality
4
, we assume zero supply of outside shares, i.e. z s = 0.
The market clearing price in the standard asset pricing model is then given by
where p e t+1 is the conditional expectation of next period's price p t+1 and y e t+1 is the conditional expectation of next period's dividend y t+1 .
Dividend {y t } is assumed to follow an AR (1) process (2.2). Suppose that the risky asset (share) is traded, after payment of real dividends y t , at a competitively determined price p t , so that y t is known by agents, and
The market clearing price in the standard asset pricing model with AR(1) dividends is then given by
where dividend y t follows the AR(1) process (2.2). Compared with our general framework (2.1), here the map f is a simple linear function and the noise u t ≡ 0.
Rational expectations equilibrium with AR(1) dividends
Under the assumption that agents are rational, a straightforward computation (see Appendix B) shows that the rational expectations equilibrium p * t satisfies
Thus based on (3.4), the unconditional mean and the unconditional variance of the rational expectation price p * t are given by, respectively, Furthermore, the first-order autocovariance and autocorrelation coefficient of the rational expectation price p * t are given by, respectively,
Existence of first-order SCEE
We now relax the rational expectation assumption and assume that agents are boundedly rational and believe that the price p t follows a univariate AR(1) process
Given the perceived law of motion and knowledge of all prices observed up to period t − 1, the 2-period ahead forecasting rule for p t+1 that minimizes the mean-squared forecasting error is
By substituting (3.9) into (3.3), we obtain the implied actual law of motion for prices
(3.10)
For the PLM (3.8) and the ALM (3.10), we first study the existence and uniqueness of first-order SCEE.
Since 0 ≤ β 2 R < 1 and 0 ≤ ρ < 1, the price process (3.10) is stationary and ergodic.
Denote the unconditional expectation of p t byp. Thenp satisfies
Imposing the first consistency requirement of a SCEE on the mean, i.e.p = α, yields
Hence using (3.5), we conclude that in a SCEE the unconditional mean of market prices coincides with the REE fundamental prices. That is to say, in a SCEE market prices fluctuate around the fundamental prices.
Next consider the second consistency requirement of a SCEE on the first-order autocorrelation coefficient β of the PLM. A straightforward computation (see Appendix C)
shows that the first-order autocorrelation coefficient Corr(p t , p t−1 ) of the ALM satisfies
It can be shown (see Appendix D) that β * is unique. We thus have the following proposition on first-order stochastic consistent expectations equilibrium. This proposition states that in a SCEE self-fulfilling market prices have the same mean as the fundamental prices, but a higher first-order autocorrelation coefficient than the fundamental prices. In other words, in a SCEE market prices fluctuate around the fundamental prices but with a higher persistence than under REE.
Numerical analysis
Now we illustrate the above results numerically. Since β ≤ 1 < R, the only equilibrium is β = 0. Therefore, in the case that ρ = 0, there is no nonzero first-order stochastic consistent expectations equilibrium (SCEE). 6 As shown theoretically above, the numerical results are independent of selection of the parameter values within plausible ranges, sample paths, initial values and distribution of noise. 7 In Figure 1a , we take β = 0.9. However in fact, α * is independent of β, as can be seen from (3.12). 
Proposition 1 demonstrates ρ < β * (ρ) < 1 for 0 < ρ < 1, and hence β * (ρ) converges to 1 as ρ tends to 1. Thus as ρ tends to 1, 
Stability under SAC-learning
In this subsection we study the stability of SCEE under SAC-learning in the asset under SAC-learning is given by
with α t , β t as in (2.8) . This is an expectations feedback system. Realized prices influence the perceptions agents have about economic reality and these perceptions feed back into the actual dynamics of the economy and determine future prices that will be realized.
In order to study the dynamical behavior of the model (3.14), we first check the stability of the unique SCEE (α * where π t is the inflation at time t, π e t+1 is expected inflation at date t + 1 and y t is the output gap or real marginal cost. λ ∈ [0, 1) is the representative agent's subjective time discount factor, γ > 0 is related to the degree of price stickiness in the economy and ρ ∈ [0, 1) describes the linear dependence of the output gap on its past value. u t and ε t are i.i.d. stochastic disturbances with zero mean and finite absolute moments with variances σ 2 u and σ 2 ε , respectively. The key difference with the standard asset pricing model is that this model includes two stochastic disturbances, not only the noise ε t of the AR(1) driving variable, but also an additional noise u t in the New Keynesian Philips curve. We refer to u t as a markup shock that is often motivated by the presence of a variable tax rate and to ε t as a demand shock that is uncorrelated with the markup shock.
Rational expectations equilibrium
If agents are rational, then a straightforward computation (see Appendix F) gives the rational expectations equilibrium
Hence the mean and variance of rational expectations equilibrium π * t are, respectively,
Furthermore, the first-order autocovariance and autocorrelation of rational expectations equilibrium π * t are, respectively,
Note that in the special case σ 2 u = 0, the above expression reduces to Corr(π * t , π * t−1 ) = ρ as in Eq. (3.7). Moreover, the larger the noise level σ 2 u in the markup shock, the smaller the first-order autocorrelation in the fundamental rational equilibrium inflation.
Existence of first-order SCEE
Suppose now that agents are boundedly rational and that their perceived law of motion for inflation is a univariate AR(1) process.
The implied actual law of motion then becomes
Denote the unconditional expectation of π t byπ and the unconditional expectation of
Imposing the first consistency requirement on the mean, i.e.π =
Therefore using (4.3), in a SCEE the unconditional mean of inflation coincides with the REE fundamental inflation.
After straightforward computations (see Appendix G), we obtain
Note that if we replace λ by , which coincides with the autocorrelation in the asset pricing model in (3.13).
The second consistency requirement of first-order autocorrelation coefficient β yields,
Define G(β) := F (β) − β. Since 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 ≤ λ < 1,
Therefore, there exists at least one β * ∈ (0, 1), such that G(β * It turns out that in the NKPC multiple SCEE may co-exist. To see this, rewrite the first-order autocorrelation, F (β) = λβ
. It is easy to see that
increases, then F (β) increases, and therefore multiple SCEE may occur. The simulations in the following subsection illustrate this point more clearly.
Numerical analysis
Now we illustrate the existence of SCEE and the effects of ρ, γ and is an intersection point of the first-order autocorrelation of inflation 
Stability under SAC-learning
The SAC-learning dynamics in the New Keynesian Philips curve with AR(1) driving variable is given by
(4.9) with α t , β t as in (2.8) . This is another expectations feedback system with expectation feedback from inflation forecasting. Realized inflations influence the beliefs agents have about economic reality and these beliefs feed back into the actual dynamics of economy and determine the future realized inflations together with an exogenous driving variable output gap or real marginal costs.
We further check the relationship between stability of SCEE (α * , β * ) and SAC-learning. The proof is given in Appendix H. If the stable SCEE is not unique, the convergence depends on initial states of the system, as illustrated in the following numerical simulations.
Numerical analysis
For (π 0 , y 0 ) = (0.028, 0.01), Figures 7a and 7b show that the SAC-learning dynamics (α t , β t ) converges to the stable low-persistence SCEE (α * , β * ) = (0.03, 0.3066). Figure   7a illustrates that the mean of inflation α t tends to the mean α * = 0.03. Figure 7b illustrates that the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of inflation β t slowly tends to 
Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced the concept of behavioral learning equilibrium, a very simple type of misspecification equilibrium together with an intuitive behavioral 9 The slow convergence is caused by the slope λ−λβ 2 1−λβ 2 in the expression (4.7), which is very close to 1 for λ = 0.99, as shown in Figure 4a . 10 As shown in Figure 4b , F (β * ) is close to 1 and hence the convergence of SAC-learning is very slow. We have applied our behavioral learning equilibrium concept to a standard asset pricing model with AR(1) dividends and a New Keynesian Philips curve driven by an AR (1) process for the output gap or marginal costs. In both applications, the law of motion of the economy is linear, but it is driven by an exogenous stochastic AR(1) process. Agents however are not fully aware of the exact linear structure of the economy, but use a simple univariate forecasting rule, to predict asset prices or inflation. In the asset pricing model a unique SCEE exists and it is globally stable under SAC-learning. An important feature of the SCEE is that it is characterized by high-persistence and excess volatility in asset prices, significantly higher than under rational expectations. In the New Keynesian model, multiple SCEE arise and a low and a high-persistence misspecification equilibrium co-exist. The SAC-learning exhibits path dependence and it depends on the initial states whether the system converges to the low-persistence or the high-persistence inflation regime. In particular, when there are shocks-e.g. oil shocks-temporarily causing high inflation, SAC-learning may lock into the high-persistence inflation regime.
Are these behavioral learning equilibria empirically relevant or would smart agents recognize their (second order) mistakes and learn to be perfectly rational? This empirical question should be addressed in more detail in future work, but we provide some arguments for the empirical relevance of our equilibrium concept. Firstly, in our applications the SCEE already explain some important stylized facts: (i) high persistence (close to unit root) and excess volatility in asset prices, (ii) high persistence in inflation and (iii) regime switching in inflation dynamics, which could explain a long phase of high US inflation in the 1970s and early 1980s as well as a long phase of low inflation in the 1990s and 2000s. Secondly, we stress the simplicity and behavioral interpretation of our learning equilibrium concept. The univariate AR(1) rule and the SAC-learning process are examples of simple forecasting heuristics that can be used without any knowledge of statistical techniques, simply by observing a time series and roughly "guestimating" its sample average and its first-order persistence coefficient. Coordination on a behavioral forecasting heuristic that performs reasonably well to a first-order approximation seems more likely than coordination on more complicated learning or sunspot equilibria, cf., for example, Woodford (1990) . Even though some smart individual agents might be able to improve upon the best linear, univariate forecasting rule, a majority of agents might still stick to their simple univariate rule. It therefore seems relevant to describe aggregate phenomena by simple misspecification equilibria and behavioral learning processes. Our behavioral learning equilibrium concept also relates to the "natural expectations" in Fuster et al. Simple linear univariate models explain a substantial part of individual inflation and output gap forecasting behavior.
In future work we plan to consider more general economic settings and study behavioral learning equilibria. An obvious next step is to apply our SCEE and SAC-learning framework to higher dimensional linear economic systems, with agents forecasting by univariate linear rules. In particular, the fully specified New Keynesian model of inflation and output dynamics would be an interesting (two-dimensional) application. Finally, it is interesting and challenging to study SCEE and misspecification under heterogeneous expectations and allow for switching between different rules. Branch (2004) where
All these results are consistent with those in Appendix 1 of Hommes, Sorger & Wagener (2004) . Note that in our paper R t is different from n t in Hommes et al. (2004) . In fact,
Furthermore,
B Rational expectations equilibrium of prices
Under the assumption that the transversality condition lim k→∞ Et(p t+k ) R k = 0 holds, the REE price can be computed as
C First-order autocorrelation coefficient of price
We rewrite (3.10) as
Thus based on (C.2) and (C.3),
That is,
In the following we will calculate
Furthermore, based on (C.2),
D Proof of uniqueness of β *
(Proposition 1)
Using the first-order autocorrelation F (β) in (3.13), it can be calculated that 3 .
which is contradictory to G(1) < 0). Hence β * (∈ (0, β 1 )) is unique and G (β * ) < 0, hence
is maximal. Thus in the case that ρ >
That is, G(β) is monotone. Therefore, in the case that 0 < ρ < 1, β * is unique and
E Proof of Proposition 2
Under the SAC-learning defined in Section 2, the state dynamics equations become
. Since all functions are smooth, the learning rule (2. Based on the analysis in Appendix D, F (β * Hence a SCEE corresponds to a fixed point of the ODE (H.1). Furthermore, the SAC learning (α t , β t ) converges to the stable SCEE (α * , β * ) as time t tends to ∞.
As shown in Evans and
) − 1
